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This project first seeks to demonstrate that there is a tension between the 
pursuit of citizenship and the process and means of empowerment for marriage 
migrant women in South Korea. This inherent tension is due to disempowering 
policies and restrictive perceptions of multiculturalism – perceptions which 
incorporate elements of ethnocentrism, cultural nationalism, gender inequality, 
familism and ideas of economic superiority. Once this tension is demonstrated 
through policy and social analysis as a crucial reason why marriage migrants are 
not acquiring citizenship in higher numbers, nor better integrating in Korean 
society, the practical consequences of this hindering factor on the strategies of 
CSOs supporting marriage migrants are explored through comparative case 
studies.  
 
The first case study is that of KOCUN, a CSO with a high level of 
institutionalization and top-down governance, while the second, the Korea 
Women Migrants Human Rights Center, represents bottom-up governance and 
strength at grassroots level. While KOCUN is found to transnationalize the 
problematic dilemma between citizenship and empowerment and to harness the 
power of the market to make up for government shortcomings, the WMHRC’s 
strategy is one of decentralization for the sake of community-building and self-
reliance, while leveraging ally forces in civil society to keep its independence.  
 
Although both approaches are valid and necessary, KOCUN encourages 
a rather unilateral effort for marriage migrants to assimilate to South Korea, 
whereas the WMHRC’s approach allows for integration at local level, a 
preliminary step to belonging to South Korea national society, all while 
mobilizing native Korean civilians who are already sympathetic to the cause 
and/or are interested in marriage migrants’ native cultures. This represents a 
fairer model for an empowering pursuit of citizenship for foreign brides. The 
case of marriage migrants remains one of the most fruitful lenses through which 
to imagine the future of South Korean multiculturalism, citizenship and civil 
society. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview of the current situation and significance of research 
As the issue of multiculturalism becomes more pressing, with the 
number of foreigners in Korea steadily increasing (at an average of 8% 
per year between 2011 and 20151) and stories like that of Yemeni asylum 
seekers monopolizing and polarizing media attention, it is useful to 
remember that the Korean government only legally recognizes the term 
for multiculturalism, damunhwa, as describing the marriage between a 
South Korean national and a foreign-born spouse2. In the eyes of most 
Koreans, the image of these “multicultural families” is even more specific: 
it is that of a Korean man married to a foreign Asian woman, the latter 
being expected to assimilate to Korean culture and to raise her children as 
Korean3. In fact, the government started employing the term damunhwa 
around 2006 as a replacement to the word honhyeol – literally “mixed-
blood”, deemed derogatory by civic society groups and academics, to 
describe half-Korean children (Jun, 2011).  
                                                 
1 Number of foreigners in Korea exceeds 2 million by Y.I. Jeong for The Korea 
Herald, July 27, 2016 
2 and 3« Damunhwa » Is No Multiculturalism: A Congolese Refugee Reflects on Life 





The term damunhwa reflects South Korea’s struggle to incorporate 
foreign-born residents in society, and marriage migrants offer a prime 
example of this phenomenon. In 2010, more than 50% of long-term 
migration flows to South Korea were composed of marriage migrants 
(OECD, 2012). Moreover, as opposed to other types of migrants, they are 
expected to settle down as Korean citizens through their Korean in-laws 
and the waiting time for them to apply for citizenship is of only two years, 
compared to five for other foreign residents according to Korean 
naturalization laws. Yet, according to the 2012 National Survey of 
Multicultural Families, only 42.4% of marriage migrants have been 
naturalized as South Koreans, whereas around 60% of them wish to 
acquire citizenship (Jeon et al., 2013). 
Given the official acknowledgement of marriage migrants and the 
existence of numerous specialized policies to provide for them, one could 
think that they are a relatively sheltered minority and that they integrate 
better in Korean society. This apparently privileged situation actually does 
them a disservice: as a recent report by South Korean NGOs to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2018) has 
underlined: this state policy has “only generated the prejudice that 
marriage migrants are all from poor area in less-developed countries and 
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that the government provides them with special advantages. Since the 
Multicultural Family Support Act was introduced in 2007, the social 
prejudice and stereotypes has become permanent.” 
On the opposite side from the state and conservative forces in 
Korean society, civil society organizations have been leading migrant 
advocacy activities in the country since the 1990s (Jun, 2013), ranging 
from volunteer initiatives to well-connected institutions. They provide 
legal and psychological resources to these women as well as represent 
them when advocating for a better legal framework, better policies. These 
two functions (service and representational) may come in tension with 
each other as they represent two different relationships with the 
government – and the provision of services may be in tension with 
advocacy for better policy. Moreover, NGOs in Korea have to 
accommodate for a certain paradigm of civil society, that of the Confucian 
“organic state” which does no distinguish between state and society, as 
well as a past of authoritarianism. Therefore, the autonomy of civil society 
is more relative than in a liberal pluralist state (Lee H.K., 1995). In this 
understanding, the work of marriage migrant women organizations is 
framed by an ambiguous relationship with the Korean state. 
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 Given the alleged importance of the South Korean government’s 
position and policies concerning marriage migrants, it is all the more 
significant to research on the topic as the Moon Jae In administration 
recently took office. Not only is it the first center-left government in 
power (with a human rights lawyer as President) since the enactment of 
the Multicultural Family Support Act (2007-2008), it is also the dawn of 
a new era of Korean foreign policy towards South East Asia with the 
announcement of the New Southern Policy in 2018. One can only hope 
that these shifts will eventually produce not simply a better socio-legal 
framework for migrants, but also, ultimately, a less one-sided version of 
multiculturalism in South Korea. 
Research question and hypothesis 
After more than a decade of government policing and targeting, 
and being defended by civic society for twice as long, why has the general 
integration of marriage migrants in South Korea seemingly not improved 
and why is citizenship still hardly attainable? How is this reflected in the 
organizational strategies of civic society organizations working in their 
defense? 
I argue that advocating for citizenship for marriage migrant 
women in South Korea is an ambiguous goal given that Korean state 
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policies, in interplay with Korean society, have created an environment in 
which citizenship does not lead to empowerment for marriage migrants. 
Indeed, for these women, Korean citizenship and membership in Korean 
society have a price: that of being deprived of agency as maternal, marital, 
immigrant subjects in a patriarchal and ethnocentric system. This poses a 
dilemma not only for migrant women but also for the civic organizations 
that represent them and their interests. I argue that depending on their 
governance characteristics and institutional levels, civic society 
organizations deploy specific strategies to find a way around said 
dilemma. They are limited, however, by the restrictive framework of the 
state-sponsored and gendered concept of Damunhwa, which has negative 
consequences on the lives of marriage migrant women.  
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This literature review seeks to delve into the various problematizations 
of citizenship, rights acquisition and empowerment, from mainstream 
contemporary views to their contestation and reinvention by scholars 
writing more specifically about marginalized groups in society -including 
women and migrants –, in the Korean or more broadly East Asian context. 
This review concludes that a study focusing on the concrete impacts of 
the tension between citizenship and empowerment on civic society 
organizations advocating for marriage migrant women in South Korea is 
necessary. 
 
Contemporary literature on citizenship, starting with T.H. Marshall’s 
seminal work Citizenship and Social Class (1950), unequivocally link the 
status of citizenship and the process of empowerment, with the latter being 
a natural consequence of the former. Indeed, citizenship is viewed as an 
institutional mechanism seeking to equalize rights and duties of all 
recipients of citizenship status. This mechanism is deemed necessary in a 
society riddled with conflict due to modern capitalism, and it is a show of 
responsibility from the state to its citizens to safeguard social order. The 
society in question in Marshall’s opus is that of late 20th century Great 
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Britain, in which social rights were acquired after civil and political rights. 
Marshall argues that the advent of social rights in such a context is due to 
a shift from citizenship as protecting the rights of the ruling class – to 
citizenship as an anti-market force, as a result of successful collective 
bargaining from the oppressed classes. As such, Marshall’s vision of 
citizenship is instrumental and tied to national politics, the welfare state 
as well as labor relations.  
As an important counter-approach to citizenship as a mechanical 
instrument tied to political participation, citizenship as membership has 
been theorized to offer a deeper sociological scrutiny of shared meanings 
and senses of belonging and connection between members of a polity. 
This approach (retroactively) includes late 19th-early 20th century 
sociologist E. Durkheim’s theorization of collective consciousness and 
interdependence of members of a society – and the shared values, norms, 
practices that come with it. Individual experiences and perceptions of 
citizenship supposedly come together and await sociological analysis to 
define citizenship as membership in a given context. 
 Scholars researching on citizenship issues regarding more 
marginalized groups in society mostly take issue with the instrumental, 
public and political rights-based approach defined by Marshall. Feminist 
critiques tend to qualify this definition as masculinist and ignoring the 
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experience of women with citizenship (Pateman 1989, Lister 2003), 
including the lack of recognition of unpaid care work in society. For 
Seungsook Moon, Marshall and his peers’ error is to create a rigid 
dichotomy between the public sphere of labor and politics, and the private 
sphere of domestic work.4 Moon’s remarks are significantly motivated by 
the characteristics of modern Korean society, in which a large proportion 
of women are housewives and mothers, or at least expected to be after 
marriage. 
 
 Among the scholars who have sought to redefine citizenship in the 
Korean context, the most prolific has been sociologist Chang Kyung-sup, 
namely with his coined concept of developmental citizenship. The former 
is highly political, though not in the same way as Marshall’s theory. 
Developmental citizenship is not the sum of rights and duties of citizens 
– but plainly ‘the collective duties of ordinary citizens’, implying not a 
responsibility from the state to its citizens but a mechanism of 
subordination to the developmental state, exploitative businesses included 
(Chang, 2012). The word collective also silently rids citizenship of the 
notion of guaranteed individual rights – only sacrifices remain as the 
                                                 
4 “Local meanings and lived experiences of citizenship: voices from a women’s 
organization”, Seungsook Moon in South Korea in Transition: Politics and Culture of 
Citizenship edited by Chang Kyung-Sup (2014) 
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country must develop. Chang goes as far as calling it developmental 
corporate citizenship as the rights of the proletariat are swept under the 
table and non-productive citizens lose the meager rights they could seek 
to receive as working citizens – and this takes us back to Moon’s 
housewives as secondary citizens. The rights received by productive 
citizens are called transformative contributory rights. Most importantly, 
not only does this definition of citizenship make little case of social rights 
– unlike Marshall’s Great Britain, the situation has not, supposedly, 
changed too significantly following the democratization of South Korea 
in the late 1980s.  
Chang makes the case for a transformative political citizenship which 
would have arisen with native democratization movements in Korea, 
whose main agents were the middle class and students, and main 
beneficiaries the lower class. However, as Chang acknowledges himself, 
this active agency and type of citizenship quite exclusively benefitted 
male laborers (Koo, 2001) and the transition of Korea into a welfare state 
has not happened. 
On the topic of the integration of foreign-born residents into South 
Korean citizenship, Chang, in his book South Korea in Transition: 
Politics and Culture of Citizenship (2014), critically opposes the concept 
of neoliberal and cosmopolitan citizenship in the context of globalization. 
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Globalization itself is argued to be an ambiguous term when applied to 
South Korea, a country which developed under foreign influence but 
without an imperialist past for itself (apart from the Vietnam war). 
Globalization was brought into Korean politics as the political tool of 
segyehwa in the early 1990s by President Kim Young Sam to plan the rise 
of South Korean legal, economic, social and cultural institutions to so-
called “global standards”. This project, as yet another transformative 
endeavor of the Korean state, ‘readjusted’ South Korean developmental 
citizenship but does not correspond to a cosmopolitan mindset. 
Concerning the national pursuit of multiculturalism, Chang argues 
that it was proposed by civil society only to be appropriated by the 
government’s “pro-business developmentalist stand”. This 
instrumentalization is demonstrated in the absence of provisions for 
foreign workers within Damunhwa policy – signaling that they are not 
welcome among Korean citizenry, as opposed to foreign brides charged 
with reproducing South Korean offspring. However, Chang semi-
enthusiastically argues for a possible compatriotic citizenship in the 
horizon, in which South Korean perceptions of citizenship are 
fundamentally changing. In parallel (or jointly), there is a prospect for a 
post-transformative society in which citizens of Korean society are still 
somehow united and brought together in the absence of economic growth 
17 
 
or developmental transformative project. These last two concepts remain 
tentative and the author himself acknowledges a certain status quo. 
 
 Taking traditional rights-based approaches to empowering citizens 
to ask for their social rights, together with the notion of transformative 
contributory rights specific to South Korean developmental citizenship, 
points to the ambiguity of a rights-based approach to citizenship, and 
therefore to a rights-based approach to empowerment. Several researchers 
have questioned this approach for the goal of improving the condition of 
migrant women in East Asia. One of them is Leah Briones, with her 
ethnographic research on Filipina migrant domestic workers in 
Empowering Migrant Women: Why Agency and Rights are not Enough 
(2013). The condition of these workers is mostly discussed in terms of 
narratives and discourses: Briones opposes a dominant paradigm of 
victimization to a desirable capability-based empowerment paradigm to 
overcome the first one. Her main argument is that the studied group must 
be endowed with capability, as the possibility to build one’s livelihood, in 
order to move on from victimization. In this case, it is better to be 
empowered through capability in order to fight for one’s rights – rather 
than to be given rights without an access to empowerment. Briones quotes 
Battistella and Bell & Piper on the topic of migrant workers, explaining 
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that as opposed to migrants moving to Western Europe, newcomers in 
Asia may have their rights tied to the stipulations of short-term contracts 
(2002, 2005). As the situation for marriage migrants significantly differs 
from that of migrant workers in Korea, the conclusions in this study may 
differ. 
 Another critical approach the complexity of rights negotiation in 
context has been Choo Hae Yeon’s in The Cost of Rights: Migrant 
Women, Feminist Advocacy, and Gendered Morality in South Korea 
(2013). Choo conducted ethnographic research on marriage migrants and 
foreign sex workers in South Korea and concluded that negotiating for 
one’s rights is not cost-free nor a harmless practice – for the studied 
groups, it is akin to a ‘gendered pursuit of morality’ which relies heavily 
on mechanisms of victimization narratives on the part of women’s 
movements. This raises the issue of a civil society-imposed moral 
hierarchy – in the scope of Choo’s study, however, it concerns mostly 
feminist and women’s movements (including non-feminist women’s 
movements) and not necessarily advocates of the selected groups. 
 
 The present research acknowledges the heavy costs of such 
victimization narratives and gendered morality. The researcher now seeks 
to understand the tension between citizenship and empowerment from the 
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perspective of state policies and their effect on civic society organizations’ 
activities and governance. The perspective of discourses and narratives is 
never really far, however, as it can be a site of contestation and 
empowerment for marginalized groups – as exemplified later in this piece. 
This will be explored in the frame of self-acceptance and self-reliance 
within structural constraints and instrumentalization – rather than on 
moral grounds within gendered morality constraints. This thesis also 
argues that the “moral landscape” Choo refers to is rather inextricable 
from Korean state policies. These are not “neutral” nor separated from the 
gendered social structure. The ideological is never too far from the 
political. 
  
 Although the present research was conducted using qualitative 
methods, it is useful to consider a representative quantitative study of 
citizenship acquisition (in the legal sense) for marriage migrants, in order 
to attach factual evidence to the study and open new paths for 
investigation. Minchul Hwang’s study based on the results of the 2012 
National Survey of Multicultural Families is a good example. According 
to him, citizenship acquisition of marriage migrants is a relatively new 
problem. Citing that only 42.4% of marriage migrants have been 
naturalized while 60% cited citizenship acquisition as their goal, as 
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opposed to only 15% aiming for permanent residence (Jeon et al., 2013), 
Hwang endeavors to explore the factors accounting for low naturalization 
success. These numbers are presented as paradoxical since marriage 
migrants are generally understood as being privileged in the race for 
citizenship, as guests of the South Korean government and expected to 
settle down in the country. 
 The factors encouraging naturalization are given as follows: 
characteristics from the origin country including legal provisions for dual 
citizenship, poverty level and distance from South Korea; a larger 
presence of one’s ethnic population in Korea; and an overall good 
experience in Korea. Factors discouraging naturalization include: shorter 
length of stay, lack of Korean language skills, lower income level as well 
as higher levels of unemployment. This raises several questions for the 
present research: not only are some factors such as “favorable” experience 
in Korea quite subjective, some others including the length of stay and 
low-income levels indicate further investigation of structural constraints 
imposed on marriage migrants are key to understanding low levels of 
citizenship acquisition. In the context of the present study, the answer may 
lie in the important sacrifices required in the pursuit of citizenship.  
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A. Theoretical Framework 
 
The citizenship-empowerment nexus 
How to approach the nexus between citizenship and empowerment in 
the most fruitful way to answer the research questions – first to prove that 
there is a tension between the two in the particular context of marriage 
migration to South Korea, then to observe its effects on the organizational 
evolutions of civic society organizations? As this thesis accepts the status 
and access to citizenship in both its politico-legal and societal meanings, 
the nexus is dissected in context along these two dimensions before 
attempting to reconcile them in the Korean context. Building such a 
framework requires to answer the following question for both 
conceptions: for marriage migrants in South Korea, in which conditions 
is the pursuit of citizenship consistent with a process of empowerment, or 
inconsistent, leading to disempowerment? 
For citizenship as a legal status which comes with rights and duties, 
one must look into South Korea’s Naturalization law, its potential 
amendments in the particular case of marriage migrants and last but not 
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least, its application. Such laws determine the necessary efforts required 
by marriage migrants to join the ranks of South Korean citizens. The 
nature of these legally-enforceable efforts shall determine how it is related 
to empowerment or, as this piece argues, disempowerment: do they 
require sacrificing one’s legal and bodily autonomy, restricting one’s 
lifestyle choices, accepting potential abuse and exploitation, accepting 
restrictive top-down norms in general, censoring one’s language, culture 
or identity? This is in contrast with classical views of citizenship 
according to which aspiring citizens, typically white working-class men, 
earn their way through citizenship in honourable manner, acquiring 
political rights using which they can ask for measures of social and 
economic justice – in other words, an empowering process from A to Z. 
To be clear, this piece does not focus on the empowering aspects of 
acquiring citizenship, but a major difference between this model, which 
has been widely criticized in citizenship studies for its masculinist pre-
conceptions, and the condition of marriage migrants in Korea, is that the 
latter first obtain social and economic rights before the political rights that 
come with naturalization. If social and economic rights are considered 
partial citizenship, something more akin to denizenship – which is the case 
here – then the conditions for accessing these rights must be examined as 
well in their relation to empowerment and, or disempowerment. Lastly, I 
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must say that my approach to citizenship as being riddled with sacrifices 
in the Korean context and for marriage migrants has been directly and 
profoundly impacted by Chang’s developmental citizenship as a sum of 
duties towards the state’s economic development (Chang, 2014) as well 
as Kim and Kilkey’s idea of marriage migration as social investment (Kim 
and Kilkey, 2016) – with all the instrumentalizing and exploitative 
possibilities these entail. 
Citizenship as membership, as belonging to a community, appears 
more complex – especially at a national level of identity and community. 
Although I argue that there is a strong link between state policies and the 
norms and values which dominant social discourses describe as “Korean” 
(or at least South Korean), no national identity is ever fully homogeneous. 
Attempts to make a country’s values homogeneous are always highly 
politicized and designed to suppress narratives both in the main opposition 
and in marginalized fringes of society which promote alternative visions 
of society. Many questions still stand, however: what are the obstacles to 
marriage migrants belonging to South Korean society according to 
mainstream societal norms? Would overcoming these obstacles be a 
fundamentally empowering or disempowering process? Considering the 
polarizing place of marriage migrants in societal debates and in Korean 
media, it is natural that marriage migrants and “multicultural families” 
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would themselves become a hot topic around which the battle over 
identities rages. This is one of the places in which empowerment or 
disempowerment can take place: can marriage migrants take charge of 
their own narratives in Korean society? Or are there overwhelmingly 
strong and relatively negative discourses on their characteristics and 
identity, discourses (and potential practices) which set them apart and 
prevent a progressive integration into society? Identities are of course 
flexible, but does reshaping one’s identity as a marriage migrant in Korea 
require to give up, unilaterally, too much of one’s core pre-departure 
identity? 
When it comes to the theoretical foundation to organizational analysis 
in the light of the tension between citizenship and empowerment, the 
nexus together in the shape of an uncooperative state and hostile dominant 
norms as gatekeeping citizenship with disempowering processes – versus 
civic society organizations trying to counter these disempowering 
processes and improve the overall conditions and autonomy of marriage 






Figure 1: Visualization of the citizenship-empowerment nexus 
 
 
Perspectives on citizenship 
 Firstly, the reason why it is the concept of citizenship and not 
simply rights that is used is partly clarified in the Literature Review. The 
pursuit of rights for marginalized migrant women been explored rather 
thoroughly and has been concluded to be ambiguous and not universally 
beneficial – if not harmful (Choo, 2013). For Briones, rights alone are 
insufficient to empower those who are not given the capability to 
overcome victimization (Briones, 2013). Taking on citizenship, in all its 
complexity and flexible definition (defined below), allows us to try and 
understand the complexity of marriage migrants’ path to belonging or not 
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in South Korea; to go back and forth between the private and public sphere 
for our analysis, which in turns expands our reflection on empowerment. 
It could eventually help us think about the future of a possible Asian 
cosmopolitan citizenship. 
 The concept of citizenship is all the more crucial to put at the 
center of the present research because of the peculiar situation of marriage 
migrants: among the numerous immigrant groups which are either 
neglected by the South Korean government or whose stay is severely 
constrained by short-term contracts, such as seasonal workers and migrant 
workers in general with the widely criticized Employment Permit 
System5, marriage migrants have the rare advantage of being expected to 
settle down in South Korea as invited citizens. Policy provisions and state 
discourse are thus supposedly adjusted to encourage citizenship 
acquisition among them, at the very least status-wise and in terms of 
family membership. 
 As for the fitted definition of citizenship in this piece, I chose to 
combine its conceptualization as a status or tool deployed by the 
government with its conceptualization as membership in a community of 
shared meanings. This is not simply in order to remain flexible with 
                                                 
5 “Migrant workers oppose Employment Permit System”, The Investor (August 17, 
2016). URL: http://www.theinvestor.co.kr/view.php?ud=20160817000937 
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regards to analyzing the tension between citizenship and empowerment, 
but also because I argue that the conditions of citizenship as a status in 
South Korea are not so far removed from the conditions of membership 
in national South Korean society, partly due to Korea’s recent history as 
an authoritarian developmental state seeking to control Korean values and 
mobilize the Korean people around them6. Government policies and their 
corresponding values in modern South Korea are analyzed in Chapter 4 
and require goingback and forth between legal rights or status and social 
incorporation. As will be shown, both are ambiguous goals for marriage 
migrants. Coming back to the distinction between the public and private 
sphere for gendered citizenship made by Moon Seungsook7, one can 
observe that marriage migrants are in between the two. Indeed, marriage 
migrants in public are presented as guest citizens eligible to social benefits 
and potential citizenship, whereas the basis for their being given a chance 
is precisely their role in the private sphere, including unpaid marital work 
and child-rearing. 
 Last but not least, in order for the conceptualization of citizenship 
to remain framed within the South Korean context, the concept of 
                                                 
6 See for instance Moon Seungsook’s Militarized Modernity and Gendered Citizenship 
in South Korea, 2005 
7 See Moon Seungsook, “Local meanings and lived experiences of citizenship: voices 
from a women’s organization” in Chapter 2. Literature Review 
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developmental citizenship coined by Chang specifically for the case of 
South Korea and detailed in the literature review is a major reference and 
conceptual precedent to this paper. In short, it is a mode of citizenship 
whose basis is not individual social rights but the “collective duties” of 
citizens as determined by the state (Chang, 2012). In return for the 
satisfactory fulfillment of these duties, certain rights are allotted in 
accordance: these are, according to Chang, transformative contributory 
rights. This framework allows us to think about marriage migrants’ 
alleged contribution, which is reproductive rather than productive. Indeed, 
marriage and subsequent childrearing are the apparent key to rights 
obtention for foreign brides. This differs from the obtention of political 
rights prior to the negotiation of social rights – as the classical model for 
citizenship – as well as from notions of membership. One could argue that 
the shared meaning here would be collective transformation, but the 
complexity of Korean identity - beyond the subjection of individuals to 
developmentalism - incites us to consider other factors including ethnical, 
social and cultural. For this purpose, the present theoretical framework 
needs to assert the scope and application of the concept of 





Perspectives on empowerment 
I chose the concept of empowerment to put in tension with that of 
citizenship after having visited CSOs advocating for marriage migrants 
and realizing the strong antagonism between their daily struggles with 
social and political discrimination and the goal of naturalization. As 
detailed previously, empowerment and rights are no synonyms. 
Empowerment is also a more interactive concept, defined in terms of 
enabling, of capacity. It encloses not simply the status of being 
empowered, which is hardly tied to a single definition, but the possibility 
to take control of one’s own narratives and redefine one’s place in all 
spheres of society. The broad notion of empowerment can therefore be 
used for analysis of government policy, civil society and more. Factors to 
empowerment and disempowerment may be very diverse and include 
policies, mindsets and stereotypes, the existence of safe spaces and more. 
When discussing the potential empowerment of non-native group 
in a given host society, the mechanisms of empowerment and 
disempowerment affecting native citizens themselves might be brought to 
light. As gender and demographics matter in this research project, the 
plight of marriage migrants might partially reflect that of native Korean 




Practical definitions of empowerment in context are explored 
below. As important as it is to define empowerment in demonstrating the 
tension between the pursuit of citizenship, as a status and as membership, 
the present research remains voluntarily flexible about the meaning(s) of 
empowerment to avoid closing any doors in analyzing the case studies of 
CSOs and their dealing with the diverse lived experiences of marriage 
migrant women. However, flexibility does not mean vagueness – which 
has plagued conceptions of empowerment related to its popularization in 
international development, to the point of emptying it of its revolutionary 
political signification. Political correctness transformed freeing 
empowerment into liberal empowerment (Sardenberg, 2008). Ultimately, 
its use by the World Bank may have encouraged the status quo as a top-
down strategy – and may have privileged the economic aspect of 
empowerment over the social (including issues of gender) and political. 
Empowerment is a multidimensional concept and this research framework 
agrees with the paradigm that empowerment is a set of radical and 
transformative means rather than a set of measurable results (Agot, 2008). 
 
According to Anne-Emmanuèle Calvès in Empowerment: The 
History of a Key Concept, the term empowerment was first popularized in 
the English language through radical black and feminist discourse in the 
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1980s, to some extent as an antonym to marginalization as a priority for 
minorities to overcome. For Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo 
Freire, it is the revolutionary process from a dominated conscience to a 
freed one, or the informed awareness to spring to action (Freire, 1974). In 
the 1990s, empowerment quickly became a buzzword of international 
development lingo after a report about “third world women” published in 
1987 by Sen and Grown advocating, beyond economic growth and 
independence, the need for political mobilization, awareness and 
widespread education to achieve gender equality. The result of 
empowerment can be integration and a gain in autonomy, which is not so 
different in itself from citizenship as membership.  
Empowerment can also be the process of transforming the power 
balance between individuals and social groups (Batliwala, 1994). 
Following Batliwala’s transformative definition, empowerment requires 
the following ingredients: a decisive ideology, the access and control to 
certain resources, as well as improved institutions. This seizing of power 
is not an oppressive one (“power over”), but a capability (“power to”) 
which can be shared (“power with”) and which origins in a powerful 
understand of one’s condition and capacity to overcome certain 
circumstances (“power from within”) – since empowerment is for 
communities rather than for the state or the market (Friedman, 1992). This 
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notion of overcoming is reminiscent of early 1980s activism – as J. 
Friedman recalls, communities have to empower themselves precisely 
because they have to battle with “disempowerment” as the historical 
process of exclusion on a systematic basis. They have to elicit 
responsibility and change from every influential institution participating 
in this oppressive system: the state, private businesses, the media and 
more. 
Taking these definitions together with the South Korean context 
for marriage migrants, empowerment can include and is not limited to the 
following processes, in no particular order: the power to challenge 
oppressive institutions; taking control of one’s narrative and the power to 
refuse victimization narratives; the power to demand a fair path to 
citizenship; the power within to not renounce to and/or “practice” one’s 
culture and identity freely in the face of adversity or exclusion; the power 
to challenge gender roles; the accessing to and use of resources; the action 
of reclaiming one’s rights; the process of gaining autonomy; and the 
“power with” to fight these battles in solidarity with one’s community and 






Perspectives on Korean multiculturalism  
  It is impossible to speak on the topic of marriage migrants in 
Korea without framing the concept of multiculturalism as damunhwa. In 
contemporary Korean language as well as for the majority of South 
Korean society, these words are synonymous. The term damunhwa was 
first used in the 2000s by civic society organizations and scholars 
advocating for the so called “multicultural” families in which one of the 
spouses is non-Korean. This appellation was an alternative and a reaction 
to the South Korean’s government use of the term honhyeol (mixed blood 
in English) in legal documents to refer to half-Korean children. Following 
accusations by civil society advocates that this practice was derogatory 
and a human rights violation, the government adopter the term damunhwa 
around 2006, before devising its multicultural policy shaping and 
targeting the “multicultural family” (damunhwa gajok) model – which 
describes the union of a South Korean national and a foreign-born spouse 
(Jun, 2011). Far from being a merely technical and politically correct 
term, damunhwa bears this specific meaning across Korean society, with 
an additional layer of details: the image of a foreign East-Asian woman 
married to a Korean man and strongly assimilating to Korean culture, 
raising her mixed children to be strictly Korean.   
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 This restrictive vision of multiculturalism calls for reflecting on a 
related concept: globalization, or segyehwa. Coincidentally, segyehwa 
also predominantly refers to a policy rather than a naturally occurring 
phenomenon. Under the Kim Young Sam presidency (1993-1998), 
globalization in the country was conceptually transformed from foreign 
influence to the necessity for South Korean institutions and technology to 
reach “global standards” – Kim’s catchphrase – in all possible fields. For 
the sake of such goals, neoliberal globalization was a logical enterprise. 
However, as pointed out by sociologist Chang Kyung-sup, segyehwa gave 
way for a “globalization without globalist philosophy such as 
cosmopolitanism”, with economic patriotism and capitalism as guiding 
ideologies. Contemporary visions of multiculturalism are not so far 
removed from this view. 
 Conceptualizing multiculturalism in context allows us to link the 
problematization of citizenship and empowerment to complex governance 
issues and cultural factors – since damunhwa is predominantly an 
engineered ethno-cultural and demographic change. It also allows us to 
swing back and forth between multiple, often gendered narratives and the 




Perspective on state-society relations and civil society in South 
Korea 
 Given South Korea’s history as an authoritarian and 
developmental state, it is useful to problematize civil society in the 
country as a predominantly antagonistic force to the state, even after 
democratization. At least up to the 1990s, civil society was not a well-
understood component of the Korean nation, its force was downplayed, 
and its legitimacy was questioned by the state (H. Lee and Yamamoto, 
1995). Whether from Confucian tradition, political interest, priority for 
security and economic growth or simple refusal to cooperate, the 
government made  
non-governmental organizations in South Korea dependent its good will 
to tolerate them. During the authoritarian period, NGOs which were not 
service-oriented but advocacy, justice and rights-oriented were labeled as 
anti-government, repressed and/or had to go underground. Interestingly, 
certain groups of the women’s movement were encouraged by 
dictatorships which reciprocated with policy research (H. Lee, 1995) – 
perhaps as a way to leverage civil society power for economic and 
demographic purposes.  
When the first democratic governments of South Korea started 
counting former activists against the former dictatorships in its leadership, 
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the relationship between state and civil society significantly improved and 
advocacy NGOs flourished, opening debates and influencing policy in the 
name of human rights or public goods, receiving attention from 
intellectuals and the wider public. However, certain accounts of civil 
society post-democratization such as Kim Sunhyuk’s8 demonstrate that 
groups that were instrumental in the movements for democracy, such as 
students or trade unions, discarded their radical militant style for political 
demands. Student groups, for example, mainly advocate in the name of 
intra-campus issues rather than broader societal causes. According to Kim 
Sunhyuk, the majority of civic society organizations created after 
democratization do not buy into Marxist class narratives nor 
confrontational movements and tactics. These citizen’s groups advocate 
for diverse causes such as economic justice or the environment. Although 
militant action has been significantly toned down, this mode of existing 
may have been useful in limiting backlash from the state when a 
significant illiberal rollback on democracy occurred in 21st century Korea, 
particularly under the Lee Myung-Bak presidency (2008-2013). The 
omnipresence of such a possibility for anti-democratic practices from the 
government, or simply political turnover, is a factor of instability to take 
                                                 
8 Kim, Sunhyuk. Civil Society in South Korea: From Grand Democracy Movements to 
Petty Interest Groups? Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (1996): 81-97 
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into account when considering state-society relations in South Korean 
context. 
Beyond feeble militantism and possible antagonism, another 
tension in the existence of civic society organizations is useful to 
incorporate to this framework. As most civic society organizations engage 
in both service and advocacy functions, their relationship with the state – 
as a resource provider and may critically vary according to which function 
is in question (H. Lee, 1995). Given this unavoidable tension, it would be 
interesting to explore whether this makes CSOs privilege one activity to 
another in order to stabilize its relationship with the state. 
  




B. Methodological Framework 
 
1. Research project: problem and hypothesis 
The research problem is to understand why marriage migrants in 
South Korea struggle to integrate as citizens in their host country despite 
their being officially invited in. I argue that there is a tension between their 
pursuit of citizenship and the process of empowerment by which they 
could define their status and identity on their own terms due to 
disempowering policies and conceptions of multiculturalism. Once 
demonstrated, the hypothesis calls for an analysis of how such tension 
impacts civic society organizations as advocates for marriage migrants. In 
order to answer the research questions and make the most of this 
hypothesis, qualitative research methods are applied. 
 
2. Research design: variables of the citizenship-empowerment 
nexus 
 
In order to transform the citizenship-empowerment nexus described in 
the theoretical framework into a workable research design, this nexus 
must be split into distinct variables along our hypotheses, all while paying 
attention to the complexity of human agency that is unavoidable in 
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qualitative research. The first task is to untangle the processes of 
empowerment and citizenship, which are interdependent variable, 
according to what this piece is trying to uncover. 
The first investigation is that of the effect of the process of seeking 
citizenship in South Korea on the process of empowerment for marriage 
migrants. A negative effect, i.e. disempowerment is expected to be the 
result. This expectation stands in direct contradiction with the classical 
interpretation in sociological studies that a move closer to citizenship is 
also a move closer to empowerment, which is to say that the processes of 
citizenship and empowerment are supposed to be interwoven in a positive 
manner; precisely, citizenship as an independent variable is supposed to 
encourage empowerment as a dependent variable. 
The second venture is to investigate how the tension between 
citizenship and empowerment, or in other words the negative effect of 
seeking citizenship has on empowerment, influences the functioning of 
civic society organizations (CSOs). This tension or negative influence is 
treated as an independent variable which would influence and explain the 
functioning of CSOs working with marriage migrants as the dependent 
variable, because the selected CSOs work primarily to ensure the social 
well-being and empowerment of migrant women – beyond urgent and 
administrative help. While the first investigation is an explanatory one, 
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the second is more exploratory, as the researcher seeks to understand in 
which ways the selected CSOs try and avoid the effects demonstrated by 
our first investigation: what can organized civil society do to counter the 
nefarious effect of institutional forces directing the citizenship process and 
disempowering marriage migrant women?  
Both variable relationships that are presented here are complexified 
by the dual nature of citizenship, one as a legal status and the other as 
membership. The implications of this duality are detailed in the theoretical 
framework. 
 
3. Methodology and data for demonstrating the tension 
 
In order to demonstrate that there is a tension between citizenship and 
empowerment, policy and legislation from various ministers and 
committees of the South Korean government are analysed using the 
established theoretical framework in order to highlight said policies’ 
pernicious effects on the struggle for marriage migrant women to earn 
membership in South Korea without having to submit to disempowering 
practices. Apart from actual policy papers from several ministries and 
government agencies, important contributions by other researchers and 
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additional data from reports written by NGO coalitions and submitted to 
the government are used to enrich the analysis. 
Building on this analysis of state policies, manifestations of what civic 
society organizations call the Damunhwa wall are analysed to emphasize 
the power of the restrictive model through the case of Multicultural 
Family Centers, the demonstration of disempowering hierarchies and 
prejudices in Korean society as well as the gendered labour division 
inherited from Korean familism. The analysis is conducted using the 
established theoretical framework with the following data: official 
information provided on the Danuri portal, the multicultural website 
portal dedicated to damunhwa families, external knowledge and accounts 
of MFSCs, survey results from the ASEAN-Korea Center on perceptions 
of ASEAN by Koreans as well as ethnographic accounts of the traditional 
Korean family system most experience by female migrants. 
 
4. Methodology for CSO analysis: comparative case studies 
 
Once the tension between citizenship and empowerment has been 
established, its influences on the work of civic society organizations 
working with marriage migrants are analysed through selected 
comparative case studies. This method was chosen in order to take this 
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study beyond theoretical analysis and examine the concrete impacts of the 
demonstrated phenomenon on civic society organizations and draw 
conclusions on the constrained role of CSOs for the support of marriage 
migrants, South Korea’s invited citizens. Ultimately, citizenship and 
empowerment are defined by a complex power balance between 
institutions and civil society. 
Two cases were selected. Their commonality is that they are South 
Korean civic society organizations (CSO) headquartered in Seoul, South 
Korea, operating both service and advocacy activities in support of 
marriage migrants. These activities include, non-exhaustively: legal and 
administrative support, psychological counseling, policy research and 
overall human rights-themed activities. Their main difference lies in their 
type of governance and level of institutionalization, mostly because the 
citizenship vs empowerment dilemma is one mainly posed by institutional 
forces and power balance, in both categories of social studies. This basis 
for comparison allows us to isolate the effects of the dilemma of 
citizenship versus empowerment following these criteria: 
(1) Governance and organizational structure 
(2) Accountability and funding structure 
(3) Evolution of activities 
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These criteria have been chosen after data collection through focal 
point interviews, because they reflect organizational areas in which the 
tension between citizenship and empowerment seems to have had 
impacted how CSOs function in-between state and society. They are 
directly related to the level of institutionalization of the studied CSOs. 
 
The first case study is conducted on the Korea Center for United 
Nations Human Rights Policy (KOCUN), representing civic society 
organizations with “top-down” governance and a higher level of 
institutionalization. Justifications include that KOCUN was created to 
carry the name and norms of the United Nations as well as being 
accountable to UNOG officers. (It is not, however, a UN-mandated 
agency. In Korea, the organization has a complex body of directors and 
representatives (see Appendix 1). KOCUN was also originally more 
dependent on government funding than the other case, due to being 
mandated to carry out the pre-departure orientation program by the 
MOGEF. 
The second case study is that of the Korea Women Migrants Human 
Rights Center. Unlike KOCUN, it does not operate by an international 
organization’s institutional norms but by a “bottom-up” type of 
governance in which local grassroots representatives determine the 
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Center’s priorities based on fieldwork evidence, during an annual meeting 
of all WMHRC branches. Following the results of this meeting, the 
Center’s work for the year is planned. Throughout the year, local branches 
hold regular community workshops. Although the WMHRC plays a 
consultative role for the national and local governments, the latter are 
rarely the main donors for the Center’s budgeted activities, significantly 
reducing its accountability towards the state.  
 
The main data sources for the case studies are notes and recordings of 
two focal point interviews with professional Korean NGO workers. The 
first one was conducted by the researcher with a  Planning Manager at 
KOCUN. I obtained their contact trough the Co-Director of KOCUN and 
SNU-GSIS faculty. The second interview was conducted with a 
Representative at the Women Migrants Human Rights Center. This 
interview subject was contacted by the researcher via e-mail and personal 
visit before the interview. Both interviews lasted about an hour, following 
a set of open questions, the same for each interview, for the interviewees 
to answer at length. The interviewees were allowed to expand on some 
questions more than others according to how important they thought one 
issue or the other was.  
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The interview with the KOCUN planning manager was conducted in 
English, whereas the interview with the WMHRC Representative, a long-
standing and experienced advocate of women migrants, was conducted in 
Korean - with the help of a trusted female classmate from SNU-GSIS. The 
gender of the interpreter is relevant here as the interview revolved around 
women’s rights and included sensitive topics such as domestic violence. 
Another potential issue of bias was discussed with the WMHRC 
Representative, who was genuinely curious to know why a young white 
woman from a developed European country was interested in the plight 
of women migrants from developing South East Asian nations to South 
Korea. I first explained my interest on the topic of multiculturalism in 
South Korea – the characteristics of which differ so greatly from 
multiculturalism in my own country – as well as my opinion that 
damunhwa reunites most great challenges of South Korean society: 
citizenship of foreign-born residents, gender inequality, state 
instrumentalization, democracy without growth and more. I then 
discussed with her my awareness of the presence of ethnic and economic 
constructed hierarchies in the conscious and/or unconscious minds of 
South Koreans (especially for the second type) and of people in general, 





Additional data for the case studies include official publications these 
CSOs have published or contributed to and the official website contents 
of both organizations. 
Within this research framework, these comparative case studies serve 
a double purpose: initially, the focal point interviews conducted sought to 
shed light on the current activities and working environment of civic 
society organizations – in order to understand what kind of obstacles they 
are facing. That is, they sought to answer the research question. As a 
second step, these same cases and interviews are explored through the lens 
of the tension between citizenship and empowerment, in order to make 
sense of the power distribution between the state and these members of 
civil society, as well as to define the survival and adaptation strategy of 
selected CSOs in the midst of this dilemma.  
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CHAPTER FOUR – EVIDENCE OF THE 
TENSION BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP AND 




Introduction: The workers-brides divide 
As mentioned previously, there is a paradox to marriage migrants’ 
struggle to acquire citizenship and integrate to South Korean society – and 
it is a policy paradox. Despite rumours of a possible merger (Chang, 
2014), completely different sets of policies are applied for marriage 
migrants and migrant workers although they are from the same sending 
countries. If the administrative existence of damunhwa families are 
mostly regulated by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
(MOGEF), migrant workers are policed by the Ministry of Employment 
and Labor (MOEL) – although other ministries of Justice, Health and 
Welfare as well as Foreign Affairs and Trade have a share in immigration 
policy. The difference between the MOGEF and the MOEL is quite clear: 
while the former indicates that marriage migrants are invited, as women, 
to settle down in Korea and build families, the latter suggests the 
limitation of one’s rights and legitimacy to be in Korea by employment 
contracts – and not necessarily fair ones.  
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The fact that damunhwa policies exclude foreign workers is thus not 
trivial – according to Seol and Kim, it is a testimony that migrant workers’ 
labour and outright exploitation will never be rewarded with citizenship 
nor social rights and benefits (Seol, 2012 and Kim, 2012). Nor has South 
Korea signed the United Nations human rights treatise ruling that foreign 
workers be allowed to live with their family (Lee, 2008), when in fact 
these situations are very common, specifically situations in which foreign 
workers are forced to hide their children “whose illegal residential status 
denies them access to” any kind of welfare. This dire situation raises 
questions on the reasons why marriage migrants, who are more desired by 
immigration policy and whose rights are comparatively more welcoming, 
are still not easily accessing citizenship. Part of the answer lies in low 
proportions of marriage migrants actually receiving these promised 
benefits (Chang, 2014). According to the Danuri website, a government-
run portal for the multicultural family community, marriage migrants’ 
rights to protection and respect as regards to their ethnicity and culture 
must be upheld, and their language, adaptation and relationship 
difficulties must be alleviated (Danuri, 2013). However, the policy review 
below proves there are gaps between official discourse, state policies and 




A. Policy evidence: familism, instrumentalization, 
commodification 
 
1. Instrumentalization for demographic governance 
 
The mere existence of marriage migration through international 
brokerage as a government policy shows that such policy will first and 
foremost be devised in the interests of the host state, whatever they may 
be, rather than in response and support to human flux which were not 
caused by government planning. This planning aspect is reflected in the 
type of policy research that were conducted by policy committees to 
devise marriage migration policy: it was the work of the Presidential 
Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy. The priority was 
thus demographic and in no way a project to integrate foreigners to make 
South Korean society a cosmopolitan one. According to Kim Hyun Mee, 
this instrumentalization is reminiscent of the developmental state’s 
planning policies of the 1970s in their democratic, quantified nature, 






2. Familism: citizenship through motherhood and marital status 
only 
 
The primary way in which damunhwa policy is disempowering is by 
promoting one single way for marriage migrants to earn their place and 
legal status as South Korean citizens: through birthing and raising children 
of South Korean descent. The 2008 Multicultural Family Support Act 
contends that its main purpose is to help multicultural families through 
helping them to “enjoy stable family living”. It does not promise to protect 
and support invited marriage migrants but puts great emphasis on 
safeguarding “the unity of society”. 
 
 
Figure 2: Article 1 of the 2008 Multicultural Family Support Act 
  
 
Beyond biased terminology, this restrictive citizenship model has 
very concrete consequences on the daily lives of marriage migrants. For 
example, their access to social rights is restricted if they do not have 
children. Indeed, welfare protection under the damunhwa policy is “for 
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Parents’. Marriage migrant women are not entitled to these rights as 
potential Korean citizens on their own. This does not merely restrict their 
access to rights – such policy also denies foreign brides the possibilities 
to make empowered and enlightened lifestyle choices for themselves and 
their families. 
 
3. Legal precarity: when the contract breaks 
 
When it comes to marriage migrants’ legal precarity, the issue is not 
so much with existing policy but with the lack of appropriate policy. The 
current Naturalization Act and Multicultural Family Support Act do not 
plan for the eventuality of divorce and of the husband’s death – no legal 
framework exists to stabilize marriage migrants’ and their potential 
children’s situation vis-à-vis citizenship and residence in such situations 
(Kim, Park and Shukhertei, 2016). Albeit extreme in terms of their 
negation of the marriage migration policy to build a secure damunhwa 
family life, these situations are quite common and often result in the 
deportation of foreign brides. In case of divorce, marriage migrants may 
be allowed to stay in the country if they prove that they were not faulty in 
the divorce. Their odds are also better if they have produced half-Korean 
children (re-find source).  
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In all other cases, visa sponsorship by the husband as expressed in 
Article 6 of Naturalization Law seals their fate: as husbands cannot or do 
not want to testify on the good marital behavior and residence of the 
spouse during yearly renewal of their residency permits, immigrant 
divorcees are sent back to their host country, sometimes without a proper 
divorce (provide additional data, analysis and sources). Moreover, divorce 
proceedings are not legally required to be translated for the foreign spouse 
(Jeong, 2019) and employment is prohibited for the foreign spouse during 
the divorce (So, 2005), which effectively bars them from hiring legal 
defense and, at a more basic level, from breaking dependency with their 
husband and potential abuser. 
The legal precarity which marriage migrants face has far-reaching 
effects even if divorce or death of the husband does not happen before the 
obtention of citizenship or permanent residency. The possibility for the 
husband to decide get rid of their wife overnight provides them with 
disproportionate and potentially abusive power over their spouse. This 
“life on probation” (Kim, Park and Shukhertei, 2016)) in the wait for 






4. Objectification and commodification 
 
I argue that marriage migrants are disempowered by their 
commodification (Kim, 2011) and objectification by marriage brokers, on 
which the state relies to maintain the steady influx of marriage migrants. 
Not only are women traded as goods in a way which denies them the 
necessary subjectivity of a future empowered citizen and in many cases 
the respect of their human rights, Korean policies have evolved towards 
the protection of Korean husbands from scams rather than the protection 
of marriage migrants’ human rights.  
Indeed, Korean Consumer Law was modified in June 2008 for scam 
prevention. As Korean husbands pay thousands of dollars for their “mail-
order bride”, they are consumers with full rights over marriage migrants, 
including the possibility to return the product and be reimbursed in case 
they are not satisfied with it, all under the supervision of patronizing 
brokers. At personal level, marriage migrants thus experience 
dehumanizing commodification upon coming to Korea. At macro level, 





B. The Damunhwa wall 
 
The term “damunhwa wall” (damunhwa jangbyeok) has gained 
popular in civil society and activist circles to talk about the 
instrumentalized appropriation of multiculturalism by the South Korean 
government as well as negative or misguided perceptions of 
multiculturalism in society. Damunhwa is a wall because it is a restrictive 
notion, label and framework to think about the multicultural future of 
South Korea, and for immigrants to fit in. Women migrants, as the target 
of damunhwa policy and societal perceptions of foreigner integration, are 
particular restricted by this wall. 
 
1.  Multicultural Family Support Centers (MFSC), where policy 
meets reality 
 
The physical manifestation of damunhwa are more than 200 
MOGEF-mandated multicultural family support centers (MFSC, 
damunhwa gajok jiweon senteo) across the country. Main free services 
include Korean language classes, interpretation and translation services, 
psychological and legal counselling as well as emergency case 
management, personal and vocational training, “family education”, 
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language assessment for children and other services pertaining to children, 
including the provision of a “bilingual environment” for families with 
children. If most of those services appear straightforward, the Danuri 
portal’s use of English words to describe some offered services can seem 
curious: for example, “character training” for marriage migrants or 
“family education” remain ambiguous in description as to the guiding 
values and attitudes of these sessions. Although the MOGEF has sustained  
continuous effort to improve the impact of services from MFSCs with 
fact-finding surveys every three years since 2009 and, for example, the 
introduction in the centers of a bilingual space for bi-cultural families 
since 2015 (Danuri, 2015), MFSCs bear the mark of the government’s 
familism and assimilationist model. Familism, because activities target 
mostly families with children and do not accept mixed families of labour 
migrants nor foreign families in which none of the spouses are Korean 
(Thona, 2017) – even for Korean language education. Assimilationist, 
because most cultural activities at MSFCs tend to privilege Korean 
language and culture over the language and culture of the wife and/or 
mother, which are rarely incorporated and valued. 
Despite the government’s efforts, only little more than half of 
marriage migrants in Korea make us of MFSC services (Oh, 2015). The 
other half may stay away from the manifestation of a one-sided vision of 
56 
 
multiculturalism and of the family, preventing the proud preservation of 
one’s identity – especially as marriage migrants come from very varied 
countries and cultures – and fair membership in South Korean society. 
Instead, they visit CSOs such as the Korea Women Migrants Human 
Rights Center or the Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights 
Policy. MFSCs represent the uncooperative authority of the Korean state 
and the overpowering authority of the husband in traditional Korean 
family culture. Marriage migrants are not well represented among MFSC 
executives either: among 217 centers in Korea, only 1 of them counts a 
migrant woman in the higher executive ranks (Jeong, 2019). This is 
definitely not an environment in which marriage migrants can take control 
of their own narratives and become citizens on a fair basis. 
 
2. Ethnocentrism and perceptions of cultural and economic 
superiority 
 
Damunhwa as a model of multiculturalism is a “wall” because its rests 
on several beliefs of superiority: that of “ethnically Korean” people over 
other ethnicities, especially those from the southern hemisphere, of 
Korean culture over native cultures of marriage migrants, and of the 
Korean economy (and thus value in the neoliberal world order) over so-
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called developing countries. Beyond perceptions of superiority, the 
Damunhwa model encourages the creation of families that privilege the 
continuity of Korean “blood” through the father and of Korean culture 
despite the incorporation of a foreign element. The latter is precisely why 
marriage migrants are trained to assimilate through language, values and 
other cultural skills such as Korean cuisine. Perceptions of superiority 
coupled with a voluntarily self-preserving immigration policies result in 
marriage migrants having to willingly erase their culture to become 
deserving citizens of South Korea and fit Koreans’ “bio-cultural identity” 
(Chang, 2014). 
Below is a representation of hierarchies present in Korean society with 
the inner circle representing the centre or favourable norm in society and 
the outer circle showing the marginalized group. This diagram is included 
in the very first chapter of a multilingual guide for immigrant women 
living in Seoul published by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (See 
Appendix 5), although predominantly written by professional civil society 
activists such as Ms. Heo from the Korea Women Migrants Human Rights 
Center, one of this research’s case studies. It is as if the first thing that 
immigrant women should be aware of when coming to Korea, and 






What follows is a direct interrogation for the reader: where do you 
stand on the Russian roulette of life in Korea? This is meant to inform 
migrants of their newfound status as a marginalized minority in Korea 
because of their gender, origin, economic status, “biological” citizenship 
status, skin colour and more. 
 
Figure 3: Hierarchies in Korean society, reproduced from TIME’S UP 




Another important component of marriage migrants’ 
disempowerment by accepting South Korean untold rules for citizenship 
as national membership is the country’s global economic elitism, not void 
of racist pre-conceptions. In a study published in April 2018 by the 
ASEAN-Korea Center survey Korean people’s perceptions of ASEAN 
countries, the first images and words that come to the mind of Korean 
youth on the topic are analysed. In the figure below, besides appreciative 
terms related to tourism, such as “vacation spot” or “delicious”, negative 
perceptions of South East Asian countries’ development are present, with 
the words “underdeveloped” and “poverty”, which translates Koreans’ 
Figure 4: Excerpt from TIME’S UP (Seoul Metropolitan Government) 
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feeling of economic superiority towards their favourite exotic travel 
destinations.  
As for perceptions of South East Asian people, migration-related 
terms such as “marriage”, “foreign worker” and “labour” are presented 
next to racial terms which, in Korean context, are not meant to be flatter: 
“dark-skinned” and “dark”. Moreover, no less than five stereotypical 
judgments of character are included: “simple”, “diligent”, “sincere” and 
“relaxed”. Although these are overall positively connotated, the first two 
terms give away their relation to images of accepting exploitative labour 
due to poverty. The fact that young people answered this survey also 
proves that these potentially harmful and disempowering stereotypes are 
not only in the minds of older Koreans. 
 
Figure 5: Mutual Perceptions of ASEAN and Korean Youth.  




3. Gendered labour and marital division 
 
The husband sponsorship system for citizenship acquisition and 
motherhood conditionality for the obtention of social rights are not merely 
policies – they reflect ways of thinking of the family that are still prevalent 
in Korean society and in the private sphere in which foreign brides start 
their life in Korea. Specifically, this entails superiority of the husband in 
the marriage, who works while the wife takes care of domestic duties and 
child-rearing. In this model, the housewife usually does not engage in paid 
work (see Moon Seungsook, 2014). This strict gender division of labour 
and marital duties often comes as a shock to marriage migrants who come 
from countries whose dominant family culture is less restricted by notions 
of gender, such as Vietnam or the Philippines. According to J. Encinas-
Franco, some Southeast Asian women who come to South Korea as brides 
are marrying up in terms of country GDP but down in terms of gender 
equality – as opposed, for example, to marriage migrants to Taiwan 
(Encinas-Franco, 2018). Marriage migrants may thus experience 
disempowering downward social mobility and have their professional 
aspirations ignored when coming to Korea, preventing economic 




Besides marital and child-rearing duties, marriage migrants insert 
themselves in a complex power system within the family, in which power 
for women is uterine, which is to say that women obtain bargaining power 
by birthing a child, specifically a son, to be faithful and obedient to his 
mother and follow her decisions (Kim, 2014). Rather then benefitting 
from this power system with their children, marriage migrants often fall 
victim to the tyranny of in-laws, particularly their mother-in-law (Seol et 
al., 2016), which often exercise psychological control over marriage 
migrants’ husband and force the women to adapt to extremely 
constraining gender roles in the home. This can only obstruct mechanisms 




CHAPTER FIVE – IMPACT OF THIS TENSION 
ON CIVIC SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
 
A. Presentation of the case studies 
 
1. Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights Policy 
(KOCUN) (유엔인권정책센터) 
 
Brief history of activities 
 KOCUN is a South Korean NGO working regionally to advance 
human rights causes following United Nations directives. Although 
KOCUN officers report to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), 
it is not a UN agency. KOCUN’s activities in support of marriage migrants 
started after the murder case of a Vietnamese bride in South Korea in 
2006. By 2007, the Pre-Departure Orientation (PDO) program was 
launched in sending countries like Vietnam and Cambodia under the 
sponsorship of the Korean Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
(MOGEF) in order to help marriage migrants in learning about their rights 
and where to find help before their arrival in South Korea. In some cases, 
specific centers dedicated to the PDO were created as in Cần Thơ province 
where many Vietnamese brides come from. However, in the early 2010s, 
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the center started receiving the visit of “returnee brides” in a dire legal 
situation, meaning marriage migrants whose marital circumstances caused 
them to hurriedly come back to Vietnam, sometimes with child, without 
having gone through a legal divorce. After nearly 10 years of PDO, the 
Korean-Vietnamese Multicultural Support (KVMS) project was started in 
Vietnam in 2016 to support these women, mainly through the sponsorship 
of private Korean companies such as Hyundai. In the Seoul office, 
activities mainly include legal and administrative support for marriage or 
divorce certificates and other civilian affairs. As for KOCUN as a whole, 
the organization slowly reduced the breadth of its other activities to focus 
on their work with marriage migrants at national and transnational level. 
 
 Categorization for analysis: “top-down” governance and 
institutionalization 
 Similarly to the other case study, KOCUN is a South Korean civic 
society organization (CSO) headquartered in Seoul, South Korea, 
operating both service and advocacy activities in support of marriage 
migrants. The difference lies in its level of institutionalization and 
relationship to institutions in general. Whereas the other chosen CSO is a 
grassroots organization, KOCUN is more institutionally-backed, created 
to carry the name and norms of the UN as well as being accountable to 
65 
 
UNOG officers. KOCUN was also originally more dependent on 
government funding than the other case, due to being mandated to carry 
out the pre-departure orientation program by the MOGEF.  
 
 Relationship to the general Korean public and other civil 
society actors 
 KOCUN offers no specific educational program or campaign on 
the issue of discrimination against marriage migrants. To a certain extent, 
exposition to public opinion is avoided, specifically with the knowledge 
that the MOGEF and National Assembly members receive backlash from 
conservative groups in society, as well as the powerful conservative 
media, when budget is allowed to multicultural family support. As for 
other civil society actors, KOCUN is primarily in contact with private 
sector companies, mainly Korean, who have operations in marriage 
migrants sending countries. 
 
2.  Women Migrants Human Rights Center of Korea 
(한국이주여성인권센터) 
 
Brief history of activities 
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The Korea Women Migrants Human Rights Center (hereafter 
WMHRC) was established in 2000 as a shelter, before the main influx of 
marriage migrants from South East Asia (and after the influx, in the 1990s, 
of Chinese brides). The shelter hosted female migrant workers for whom 
immigration laws and policies, designed for male migrants, did not 
prepare for the eventuality of marital, domestic violence and reproductive 
emergencies. Shortly after opening, Korean classes started as there was a 
demand from women. Soon, marriage migration became a full-fledged 
and regulated phenomenon, and from then on counseling and violence-
related services were offered at the Center. Throughout the years, local 
branches were established across South Korea. In recent years, 
community-building activities and human rights-themed workshops have 
become the Center’s primary activities. Activists also conduct policy or 
issue-themed research, such as marital sexual violence faced by marriage 
migrants. 
 
 Categorization for analysis: “bottom-up” grassroots 
governance 
 Like KOCUN, the Women Migrants Human Rights Center is a 
South Korean CSO supporting marriage migrants through service and 
advocacy activities and headquartered in Seoul. Unlike KOCUN, it does 
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not operate by an international organization’s institutional norms but by a 
“bottom-up” type of governance in which local grassroots representatives 
determine the Center’s priorities based on fieldwork evidence, during an 
annual meeting of all WMHRC branches. Following the results of this 
meeting, the Center’s work for the year is planned. Throughout the year, 
local branches hold regular community workshops. Although the 
WMHRC plays a consultative role for the national and local governments, 
the latter are rarely the main donors for the Center’s budgeted activities, 
significantly reducing its accountability towards the state. An illustration 
of the WMHRC’s overall approachability can be observed on the Center’s 
multilingual webpage (See Appendix 2)9, on which the first item is the 
sentence “We Listen to Your Story” followed by a welcoming open letter 
written by an actual migrant. 
 
 Relationship to the general Korean public and other civil 
society actors 
 Although the WMHRC, like KOCUN, does not usually directly 
confront the wider Korean public about issues concerning marriage 
migrants, many collaborations with various groups of civil society play an 
                                                 




important part in the Center’s activities, mostly through volunteering. 
This includes student organizations from Ewha Womans University for 
language teaching, groups of lawyers working pro bono to solve migrant 
women’s legal issues, medical corporations offering care and assistance – 
generally to domestic violence victims – and other regular citizens. Beside 
this strong role for Korean citizenry, the private sector is also involved as 
a number of Korean companies incorporate support to the WMHRC to 




B. Effects of the tension on the functioning of the CSOs 
 
1. Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights Policy 
(KOCUN) 
 
Effects on governance and organizational structure 
Strong role of domestic activists and “deported” role of 
marriage migrant activists  
 Due to disempowering policies and conditions in South Korea, 
marriage migrants may not be able to fend for their own cause and claim 
their own rights when in their host country. No matter how informed they 
are, foreign brides have to face legal and administrative proceedings 
which are fully in Korean language and a bias against them, as foreigners 
and as women, in civilian affairs – a translation of societal norms as well 
as a direct impact of the husband sponsorship system. Moreover, legal 
protection is expensive and directly plays into webs of institutional power. 
This is where South Korean activists come into play – or, in the case of 
KOCUN, CSO officers which deal with these mostly bureaucratic tasks, 
which can be as mundane as the correction of a typo on one’s name on 
identification documents. Beyond disregarding one’s identity, such a 
mistake can have far-reaching consequences – for example a transnational 
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legal conundrum between the woman’s Korean identification and her 
information in her home country. In case of separation from the husband, 
nothing about her administrative status in Korea can be changed. I argue 
that KOCUN harnesses its institutional power to fill the gap, sparing 
marriage migrants the citizen-like tasks of interacting with government 
officers. 
 Since marriage migrants have no strong role to fulfil in KOCUN’s 
activities in South Korea, the other and perhaps more fortunate side of the 
coin is that they are called to action when it comes to KOCUN’s activities 
abroad, mostly in Vietnam with the Korean-Vietnamese Multicultural 
Support project (KVMS) since 2016 (See Appendix 4). The Cần Thơ 
center for Vietnamese divorcees namely includes “a children's library, 
legal advice office, kitchen, lecture room and auditorium, as well as 
accommodation and showers for volunteers”10. These activities, mostly 
operated and facilitated by former marriage migrants, attest to a stronger 
community role in the sending country than in any Korea-based KOCUN 
program. Despite their transnationalized struggles and precarious legal 
status (including for their children), marriage migrants seem more 
                                                 
10 “Hyundai supports returned Vietnamese divorcees”, The Korea Times (January 25, 
2018) 
    URL: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/07/419_243063.html 
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empowered to be their own defenders as well as take control of their own 
lives and narratives when back in their native region and country.  
 
Effects on accountability and funding structure 
From an oppressive institution to another: state to the market 
 Changes in KOCUN’s funding and accountability structure may 
well reflect the evolutions in marriage migration trends and the new 
manifestations of the tension between citizenship and empowerment that 
come with it. Despite the Pre-Departure Orientation program having been 
KOCUN’s flagship program for a long time and a proven really important 
component of the CSO’s human rights support system for marriage 
migrants, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family’s budget to support 
it has been decreasing for several years. This does not reflect a decrease 
in demand, as marriage migration influx from Vietnam and other countries 
remain steady. 
However, the government is not the only institutional shareholder 
in the lives of marriage migrants. Korean chaebol conglomerates have 
been partnering with KOCUN for their CSR – which serves their capitalist 
commercial interest in South East Asian markets and the potential half-
Korean labour force made of damunhwa children. For example, Hyundai 
Motor is the biggest sponsor for the returnees and divorcees program in 
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Vietnam. KOCUN has to adapt to and harness institutional interests in the 
situation of marriage migrants: Hyundai’s welcome private funds for the 
KVMS project are used to finance the fixed costs of the Pre-Departure 
Orientation program which the MOGEF is gradually neglecting. Despite 
the fact that the increasing number of returnees and divorcees to marriage 
migrant sending countries represents the failure of South Korea’s 
damunhwa policy and foreigner citizenship, the government has also 
shown interest in the KVMS project, allegedly as to not give up on the 
“Koreanization” of multicultural children that the state has invested in. As 
for chaebols, they might take little interest in citizenship in a context of 
neoliberal globalization. They may support former marriage migrants’ 
economic empowerment back in Vietnam, but this may point to a new 
manifestation of Chang’s contributory rights and neoliberal 
developmental citizenship. 
 
Effects on the evolution of activities 
Hosting all empowering activities only in sending countries 
As observed with KOCUN’s organizational structure, the major part 
of the CSO’s activities are hosted not in South Korea, but in the sending 
countries. On top of this, most activities conducted in Korea are primarily 
administrative and only involve the critical role of Korean KOCUN 
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officers, charged to deal with “uncooperative husbands and the state” 
(Kim, Park and Shukhertei, 2017). In a way, the CSO takes it role in Korea 
as an inevitable semi-institutional intermediate between marriage 
migrants and the discriminatory state and society, giving up on the 
empowerment of foreign brides in their host country as a lost cause. 
Whereas this mode of functioning may be based on the premise that the 
situation in Korea cannot be fixed by civil society, KOCUN’s activities 
abroad represent the only areas in which KOCUN believes things can 
improve: pre-marriage preparation through the PDO and post-marriage 
rehabilitation through returnee support. The PDO does impart marriage 
migrants with knowledge of their human rights, but it also gives them 
tools for assimilation as a prerequired condition for their incorporation in 
South Korea, instead of addressing the restrictive damunhwa model 
directly. Hopes for a pre-marriage orientation program for Korean 
husbands are not rare in the minds of CSO members, but its 
implementation seems unlikely. As for the KMVS, it is perhaps the most 
empowerment-focused KOCUN program, and it is enabled by different 
modes of citizenship and empowerment than what is available in South 
Korea. It does not, however, act upon the factors that made marriage 




2. Women Migrants Human Rights Center (WMHRC) 
 
Effects on governance and organizational structure 
Empowerment of marriage migrants sans citizenship? 
The Women Migrants Human Rights Center started as an actual 
shelter for victims of domestic violence and women migrants facing 
emergencies specific to their gender and situation, but it seems that the 
Center has become a shelter from all that is hostile in South Korea’s 
oppressive society, policies and norms. From data collected in the 
interview, some Seoul headquarter professional activists hold a rather 
pessimistic discourse on the possibilities for betterment of damunhwa. As 
long as “poverty, discrimination, hierarchy, toadyism and sexism” are not 
resolved simultaneously overnight, which it realistically cannot, they say, 
there is little chance for the situation of marriage migrants to ever 
improve. Beyond pessimism and rejection of oppressive institutions, there 
may be the paradigm-changing realization that citizenship and 
empowerment cannot be simultaneously pursued and practiced by 
marriage migrants. It is also the belief that as their main defender in South 
Korea, CSOs may have to focus on one over the other. As an organization 
privileging the voices and experiences of marriage migrants themselves, 
the WMHRC seemingly chose empowerment, which here requires to be 
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“freed” of hopes for general citizenship and membership in Korean 
society and the abandonment of particular goals. One of the organizational 
means of empowerment that the Center has put in place is 
decentralization. The analysis of this change actually unveils a new type 
of citizenship, one that is not in such tension with citizenship. 
 
Decentralization: importance of local and regional branches  
Although the Seoul headquarters of the Center help coordinate all 
local and regional branches, the latter are extremely important to the 
WMHRC’s “bottom-up” strategy to relieve the tension between 
citizenship and empowerment. A comparison with Moon Seungsook’s 
study of the citizenship discourse in the women’s organization People’s 
Friendship Society (PFS) in Korea can offer a similar perspective. PFS 
emphasizes the importance of physical proximity of local branches for 
local members as a way for housewives to “develop a new political 
subjectivity” as citizens, mostly because their membership of Korean 
society is defined primarily in the private reproductive and marital 
spheres, whereas traditional notions of citizenship emphasize citizens’ 
public roles, i.e. working men. Although single professional women are 
more numerous in the ranks of the Seoul PFS headquarters as full-time 
professional activists, housewives not only participate in local activities 
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but also have the opportunities to be civilian leaders in local branches. As 
for the WMHRC, the Seoul headquarters are also mostly run by 
professional activists, although they are not all Korean. Local branches 
offer an opportunity for marriage migrants to become civilian leaders in 
their own local communities of other women migrants. Perhaps they also 
develop a “new political subjectivity” conducive to a new type of 
citizenship and a membership in a smaller community that the whole 
South Korean citizenry. Most importantly, communities are strengthened 
and empowered to be resilient and self-reliant in the face of legal and 
socio-economic adversity. This is in sharp contrast with the governmental 
Multicultural Family Support Centers (MFSC) in which marriage 
migrants are very rarely made directors. The WMHRC’s decentralized 
governance manifests itself at least once a year through the annual 
meeting in which local activists are the main voices to determine priorities 
for the CSO. 
 
Effects on accountability and funding structure 
Distrust of and reduced dependence on the government 
Due to the shortcomings and pernicious effects of the legal and 
political framework put in place by the South Korean state around 
marriage migrants and their family, the WMHRC strives to protect these 
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women and offer them stability despite potentially precarious situations 
by keeping a distance with ministries and government agencies practices 
and interests. The price of this strategy is to receive less funding from the 
MOGEF. The achieved stability is useful in two manners, both creating 
the idea of a safe space from government: for the safeguarding of human 
rights as well as for empowerment.  
Although human rights are not as directly threatened by 
government as under the former administrations, the Center remains 
cautious. For example, under the Lee Myung Bak- and continuously under 
the Park Geun Hye-administrations, so-called “illegal residents” were not 
supposed to receive shelter nor emergency help. As a result, the Center 
welcomed women migrants in distress in the shelter without officially 
registered them, a practice merely tolerated by authorities. In the first 
months of the Moon Jae In government, the law changed: once the person 
is exposed to violence, they have a right to receive emergency care and 
shelter regardless of visa status. This change is extremely recent and 
former government practices have created a memory and organizational 
practice and pattern that still has strong effects on the WMHRC’s 
operating mode. If anything, the “positive” regime change only proves 
that political instability will potentially harm women migrants’ rights 
again in the future as administrations will keep changing. Moreover, the 
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Center deals with both marriage and labour migrants without 
discrimination – and women labour migrants also have to abide by 
unrealistic policies such as their absence of right to live with children, 
despite many of them being mothers. The superposition of causes partly 
explains the Center’s undying distrust of the state and the wish to put a 
distance between it and women migrants. The same goes for local 
governments such as the Seoul city government, although relations have 
gotten slightly warmer since Park WonSoon’s elections. 
I argue that this distrust and distance because of human rights 
issues have translated into the Center’s wish to be mostly financially 
independent from the state to finance its community-building and 
empowerment programs, although it does respond to some call for 
projects from the MOGEF (but not during the Park administration). A 
collateral issue with government funding is the restricted use of the money 
according to government interests, for example supporting half-Korean 
children more than their mothers. Since the Center cannot rely on the 
public sector, it had to find allies in the private sector. 
 
Reliance on civil society for funding and services 
Financially, the Center has to rely on funds received from individual 
donors or private corporate donors, namely through their CSR strategy. 
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The difference with KOCUN is that the use of these funds is not restricted 
to companies’ sole commercial interest and goals are set by the WMHRC 
– activities are not co-designed with any conglomerate. The other 
characteristic of the Center’s private sector support is that it is more akin 
to a volunteering community than to a diffuse influx of money. Indeed, 
the work of civilian volunteers blends in with that of pro-bono lawyers, 
doctors or caregivers. For most, supporting women migrants takes the 
appearance of a citizen’s duty for the sake of human rights and the 
common good. It is interesting to note that Master’s and PhD student 
volunteers are at the forefront of this civil society support movement, in a 
way that is reminiscent of their involvement in the democratization 
movements. 
 
Effects on the evolution of activities 
Decrease in regular integration/assimilation services and 
increase in human rights-focused activities and services 
One of the recent evolutions in the Center’s activities is the 
progressive decrease in Korean language class services. Although 
linguistic ability is a vehicle of survival, empowerment and membership 
altogether, Korean classes bear the shadow of the assimilationist, mono-
culture damunhwa model – especially in relation to MFSCs. Actually, the 
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main reason for this change is the increase in existing volunteer teaching 
organizations, for example from Ewha Womans University students. This 
externalization allows the Center to focus on human rights and 
empowerment-themed activities touching upon women migrants to 
encourage community-building, self-reliance and training of community 
leaders regardless of citizenship or marital status. These activities include 
themed workshops such as a Me Too workshop. Similarly to other 
movements of minorities across the world, discussing one’s specific 
issues in a safe space and learning about one’s rights are important 
vehicles of empowerment. These community-consolidating activities go 
hand-in-hand with the WMHRC’s decentralized organization.  
 Despite this focus on community activities, professional activists 
at headquarters still play an important role in the Center’s activities 
beyond national coordination – they conduct research, including policy 
research, about the condition of women migrants in Korea. Research 
themes – for example sexual violence for the year 2018 – mirror the 
priority theme chosen each year at the organization’s national meeting. 
This is in order to produce informational knowledge of women migrants’ 
struggles, in hope of stimulating academic writing, influencing policy and 
raising awareness among Korean citizens who care enough to take interest 
in the situation. 
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C. Conclusions on comparative case studies 
 
Effects on governance and organizational structure  
Transnationalization and decentralization 
 It appears that the demonstrated dilemma between national 
citizenship and empowerment has powerful effects on the geographical 
configuration of both CSOs, which accommodate differently depending 
on their level of institutionalization. For KOCUN, the strategy is a 
transnational answer to a transnational problem, a strategy which is made 
possible due to its institutional network and leverage. Korean officers are 
present in all locations of KOCUN’s activities, but especially at Seoul 
headquarters where they deal with an uncooperative government and 
sometimes hostile social forces. In Vietnam, marriage migrant returnees 
and volunteers can take on a bigger role, although new problems arise due 
to divorce proceedings and the legal status of damunhwa children. 
Overall, governance remains mostly in the hands of professional Korean 
women activists. For the Women Migrants Human Rights Center, despite 
professional coordination from headquarters, the CSO’s true 
organizational strength – and means of empowerment – resides in its 
decentralized leadership and encouragement of self-reliance of 
communities at local and regional level. To sum up, KOCUN goes beyond 
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the tension between citizenship and empowerment by working 
transnationally, thanks to institutional leverage and network, whereas the 
WMHRC goes beyond this tension by working locally, harnessing 
grassroots-type strength. 
 
Domestic activists and foreign minorities 
 Geographical configuration aside, KOCUN’s stronger roles given 
to professional Korean activists appears to be the norm for CSOs in South 
Korea. In her lecture about “Gender, Citizenship and Empowerment of 
Marriage Migrants in East Asia” given in June 201411, Taiwanese scholar 
and activists Hsiao-Chuan Hsia explains that whereas in Taiwan, the role 
of marriage migrants is very strong in contesting state policies and 
domestic activists only fulfil a supporting role, South Korean civil society 
generally gives a stronger role to South Korean activists and a non-
decisive role to migrants. Potential causes include, on Taiwan’s side, a 
ethnic-minority sensitive political history and split identities at national 
level, and on South Korea’s side a homogenous population and strong 
state combined with a historically strong and resistant social movement. 
In this perspective, the WMHRC’s approach may represent a necessary 
                                                 
11 “Gender, Citizenship and Empowerment of Marriage Migrants in East Asia by 




change in civil society and social movements to incorporate social and 
ethnic minorities in a homogeneous state. The potential power of Korean 
activists is not lost, however, as their contestation of policies continues 
namely through research. Moreover, women migrants are encouraged to 
nurture their own communities and solidarity before taking on any 
contestation role against institutions. 
 
Effects on accountability and funding structure 
Decreased reliance on the state and rising importance of businesses and 
civil society 
 Both CSOs have had to decrease their reliance on the state, due to 
untrustworthy legal framework, practices and instrumentalization 
strategies – and despite the inevitability of maintaining a relationship with 
at least the MOGEF and lawmakers. The MOGEF’s declining support for 
pre-departure orientation, new commercial interests in South East Asia 
and sustained interest in half-Korean children have influenced KOCUN 
to review its budgeting strategy, find a middle ground and harness the 
capitalist interests of large private donors. On the opposite end, counting 
on the state has never been an option for the WMHRC which began as a 
shelter in 2000, which was before any legal framework for female 
migrants was in place. Its activities were merely tolerated, and recent 
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changes can hardly reconfigure the Center’s accountability mechanisms. 
Keeping a distance between the CSO and the state is deemed necessary to 
guarantee a safe space and a stable environment for women migrants to 
nurture communities in. The WMHRC does turn to the private sector for 
funding and services, but it is truly the power of civil society that is 
harnessed here through pro bono actions and the help of volunteers. They 
may be bound together by a moral or civilian duty to help. Multiplying 
allies in civil society allows the Center not to “uproot” its work with the 
pressure of institutional accountability. 
 
Effects on the evolution of activities 
Community-building in the face of adversity 
 The evolution of both CSOs’ activities is where they are most 
divergent, although both engage in community-building in a way which 
follows their geographical and organizational configuration – 
transnationalization or decentralization – and a certain way of confronting 
the tension between citizenship and empowerment. With PDO, KOCUN 
gives valuable tools for women to potentially integrate as South Korean 
citizens, through the knowledge of human rights and language skills – but 
the CSO cannot fully protect marriage migrants from marriage brokerage 
and South Korean laws. Moreover, trying to reduce the cultural difference 
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between spouses cannot go only one way, as KOCUN officers are 
themselves aware, regretting that husbands are not held responsible to 
similar efforts. The ultimate failure of damunhwa policy triggered the 
need for post-marriage arrangements from civil society due to the absence 
of a transnational legal framework for this eventuality (Kim, Park, 
Shukhertei). From this failure and potentially traumatic experience, 
KOCUN strives to create communities of women who went through the 
same ordeal, strengthened by common identity and experience. KOCUN 
still receives sufficient institutional support and funding for these 
transnational activities because the fate of half-Korean children, about 
80% of them with Korean citizenship, is at stake. 
 KOCUN’s community consolidation post-return is mirrored in the 
WMHRC’s community-building activities in Korea. As marriage 
migrants cannot rely on the Korean government for citizenship, nor on 
Korean society for membership, they turn to the stability of the Center and 
its local branches to become community leaders, learn self-reliance and 
emulate a sense of solidarity – which is challenging in itself as different 
groups of women migrants, subjected to different policies, are included in 
these communities. It is nevertheless a preliminary step to a fairer path to 




Combined visualization of effects 
Tabular 









CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSION 
 
A. Research project summary and answer to the 
research questions 
 
This project sought first to elucidate what stands between marriage 
migrants and citizenship in South Korea. My hypothesis is that there is in 
this context a tension between citizenship and empowerment, between the 
legal and membership processes of belonging to the South Korean nation 
and the freedom to live by one’s narrative, empowered on social, 
economic and political levels. Policy and societal analysis are used to 
provide a landscape of the disempowering effects of the pursuit of 
citizenship on the lives of marriage migrant women.  
The demonstrated tension is thus due to disempowering policies and 
restrictive perceptions of multiculturalism – perceptions which 
incorporate elements of ethnocentrism, cultural nationalism, gender 
inequality, familism and ideas of economic superiority. The maintenance 
of such a restrictive legal framework as well as discriminatory society 
hierarchies keep marriage migrants at bay of attaining South Korean 
citizenship without significantly restricting their legal and personal 
autonomy; on the membership side of citizenship, national belonging to 
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South Korea – when one’s identity and origin are the less desirable ones 
according to mainstream cultural and economic hierarchy – appears to 
entail self-censoring of one’s identity and to live with the knowledge that 
one may never be considered Korean based on mere ethnicity. 
In the face of such restrictive laws, policies and mainstream norms in 
society, civic society organizations take on the defense of marginalized 
groups and their rights – South Korea is no exception. It made sense, 
therefore, to investigate the impact of the tension between citizenship and 
empowerment on the organizational strategies of CSOs working with 
marriage migrants. Using two comparative case studies of CSOs which 
differ from each other by their level of institutionalization, this impact was 
analysed along three types of organizational changes which were deduced 
from interview data: (1) Governance and organizational structure, (2) 
Accountability and funding structure and (3) Evolution of activities. For 
category (1), while the more institutionalized KOCUN is found to 
transnationalize the problematic dilemma between citizenship and 
empowerment and to harness the power of the market to make up for the 
government’s shortcomings, the WMHRC’s strategy is one of 
decentralization for the sake of community-building and self-reliance, 
while leveraging ally forces in civil society to remain independent.  
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Two models for CSOs to reduce or at least circumvent the tension 
between empowerment and citizenship emerge: while KOCUN advocates 
for transnational legal and institutional change in order to stabilize the 
situation for marriage migrants in the region and protect their rights, the 
WHMRC’s decentralization suggests undermining the tension from inside 
through the creation of new and empowered social and political 
subjectivities at community level.  
I argue that both approaches are complementary answers to the 
difficulties of damunhwa policy and practice. If there is no push by 
organizations such as KOCUN for an appropriate transnational legal 
framework for “multicultural” families, anxiety-inducing instability will 
persist in the life of marriage migrants. If there is no civil society initiative 
to help returnee brides following the failure of damunhwa policy, how 
will they recover alone in this relatively new situation? However, an 
approach such as KOCUN’s, by taking the problem mostly 
transnationally, may not be complete as it partly ignores the issue of 
citizenship as membership of national South Korean society. Actually, it 
does not ignore it but rather approaches the issue unilaterally, through Pre-
Departure Orientation programs which teach marriage migrants rudiments 
of the Korean language and inform them of their human rights. Such a 
unilateral effort on the part of immigrants does not bode so well for 
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empowering national integration, as it is combined with restrictive 
assimilation. During the interview, the KOCUN Planning Manager 
expressed regret at the fact that there is no such pre-marriage orientation 
program for future husbands, in which they could learn about their future 
wives’ culture and rights. Obstacles to such an initiative appear rather 
obvious: apart from the possibility that future husbands of marriage 
migrants may opt out of such programs, it is unlikely for now that the state 
or businesses would find interest, namely commercial interest, in pursuing 
this. On the other hand, the WMHRC’s activities are not bound to these 
commercial interests, nor are they unilateral. Not only does the 
decentralization of the Center allow for community-building and 
integration at local level, a preliminary step to belonging in wider circles, 
it also requires an effort of South Korean society by mobilizing parts of 
civil society which are already sympathetic to the cause and/or are 
interested in marriage migrants’ native cultures. 
Apart from better, bilateral relations between sympathetic fringes of 
civil society and efforts from marriage migrants to integrate; as well as an 
emphasis on local community-building as a preliminary step to national 
citizenship as political and social subjects, the grassroots model as 
exemplified by the Korea Women Migrants Human Rights Center has got 
another selling point which matters for the future of Korean 
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multiculturalism. That is, although there are regional and international 
issues concerning marriage migrants at transnational model, 
multiculturalism is a South Korean problem. As such, it should be 
accepted by South Korean civil society as something to be resolved in 






Among various limitations, this research’s comparative case studies 
do not constitute a systematic analysis of civic society organizations 
working with marriage and women migrants in Korea in general: there 
might be many more forms of CSOs along the spectrum of 
institutionalization and as many strategies to counter the tension between 
citizenship and empowerment. The selected cases, however, aim at 
exploring opposite ends of that spectrum. Another limitation is that Seoul, 
where data was collected for the case studies, is not representative of the 
entirety of South Korea – the research may thus be influenced by the point 
of view of primarily professional Korean activists working at the 
headquarters of these CSOs. 
The main practical limitation to this research was the lack of time to 
collect data more extensively in the shape of interviews with more staff 
members of CSOs and perhaps with marriage migrants themselves. An 
important personal limitation and issue of ethic may be unconscious bias 
regarding the situation of a non-white and generally economically-
disadvantaged population. The researcher does not pretend to know 
exactly what women migrants go through upon entering Korea – some 
may be successful in their pursuit of the “Korean dream” – but the focus 
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is on activism and issues of governance rather than the direct experience 
of migrants, also in order to fit an international studies scholarship 
approach. 
As regards to future research, speculating about the future of 
mobilizing social consciousness about multiculturalism through 
progressive – but careful – government policies may be of interest to move 
past usual dichotomies and see how civic society organizations fit into this 
changing puzzle. Another interesting pathway for research would be to 
think about the existing and potential ways in which efforts for foreigner 
integration can become more bilateral between host societies and 
newcomers. This need was also identified by the ASEAN-Korea Centre 
in a recently published report, in which they endorsed the empowerment 
of an “ASEAN wave”, which the Centre describes as “the spreading of 
culture occurring in tandem with the movement of people” (AKC, 2019). 
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1. Webpage: Governance body for KOCUN12 
 
                                                 
12 URL: http://www.kocun.org/v1/load.asp?subPage=130 (retrieved Feb. 2019) 
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2. Webpage: WMHRC’s English welcome page13 
 
 
                                                 
13 http://www.wmigrant.org/wp/english/ (retrieved Feb. 2019) 
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3. Tabular data collected for case studies (Jan.-Feb. 2019) 
ISSUE KOCUN WMHRC 
Person 
interviewed 
Choi Jaekyoung, Planning 
Manager 
Heo YoungSook, Representative 
Brief history 
2006: Murder case of a 
Vietnamese bride, trigger for the 
new program → to help 
marriage migrants to learn 
about their rights and where to 
find help 
2007: Pre-Departure 
Orientation program, fully 
sponsored by the MOGEF 
since ~2009 
Since then, budget cuts despite 
steady influx of marriage 
migrants (mainly VN & PL) 
2011: Can Thao center to carry 
out PDO but had to deal with 
returnee brides → counseling 
for returnees wanting to 
divorce 
2016: Official launch of the 
Korean-Vietnamese 
Multicultural Support project 
 
Established in 2000 as a shelter. Context: 
emerging immigration laws and policies were 
designed for immigrant men as a labor force – 
no provision or shelter for women’s marital and 
reproductive emergencies. Started Korean classes 
shortly after opening because of high demand. 
Soon, marriage migration started, as well as 
counseling and violence-related services. Local 
branches were established across Korea. 
Recent 
evolutions 
Changes in KOCUN’s 
organization: marriage migrants 
used to be a smaller portion of 
their work. General decrease of 
KOCUN’s size and staff 
towards specialization on PDO 
after 2016. Also meant 
becoming more distant from the 
UN. 




Focus shifting away from Korean classes [support 
of the many existing teaching organizations] and 
closer to community-building and self-reliance 
as well as human rights activities. Dramatic 
increase of migrant women since 2005 <> 




Korean classes, human 
rights, resources, etc. Staff 




 Korean classes  
 Shelter and redirection to medical, 
psychological and legal support 
 Human-rights based programs, support of 
local community network and training of 
community leaders 




Project: legal counsel 
(divorce papers), Korean 
lessons, self-empowerment 
groups, communities 
 Seoul office: legal work 
around marriage and divorce 
certificates, civilian 
affairs… 
 Policy or issue-themed research 
Categorization 
An institutional organization? 
More akin to activists doing 
administrative work in Korea + 
marriage migrants empowered to 
help other returnees in SEA 
countries 
A grassroots organization? Perhaps not but 
emphasis on accessibility and supporting the 
empowerment and self-reliance of local 
communities. Goal to create a sense of 
community among immigrant women from 
similar cultural backgrounds. Ex. Regular 
meetings and discussion sessions among 
community leaders. 
Goal setting 
General goal to improve 
returnees’ situation and bring 
attention on the issue to the 
National Assembly 
Reports submitted to the United 
Nations every 4 years 
Annual meeting of local office representatives 
and members, regular community workshops 
throughout the year. The choice of a focus/pillar 
area is supposed to come naturally from field 
experience and the Center’s work is planned 




Both the government and the UN 
do not care much for returnee 
brides. Interest mainly in 
legally Korean children. 
Distrust, distance 
Lee/Park administrations: skeptical of accepting 
‘illegal residents’ so there was no official 
registration of women helped and sheltered 
through the center, Center’s activities tolerated 




Globally better relations with 
MJI administration. Sudden 
interest in South East Asia, 
Kopino children issue, etc. 
Human rights as well as 
commercial interests. 
Continuous interest for legally 
Korean children in SEA and 
their welfare. 
Will to launch a new 
multicultural support project in 
northern Vietnam. 
Declining funds from MOGEF 
for PDO. 
Following seminars in Can Thao, 
booklets sent to ministries & the 
National Assembly. 
Change in legal status under MJI administration: 
once the woman is exposed to violence, she has a 
right to be in a shelter and to receive help 
regardless of visa status. 
Frequent open discussion events to increase 
awareness of issues and obtain public support. 
Wish to remain independent and to keep a 
distance, so that beneficiaries’ conditions are 
stable and not dramatically affected by 
administration changes. Similar for Seoul City 
govt, slightly better since Park WonSoon’s 
election. 
Funding 
PDO program funded by 
different govt bodies & private 
companies in Vietnam, then 
 Very rarely funded by the government (see 
reasons above) but responding to call for 
projects by the Gender equality support 
funding program (MOGEF?) – however not 
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Cambodia, Mongolia, etc.- 
decreasing 
Korean-Vietnamese program 
supported by chaebols CSR ex. 
Hyundai 
 Private funds for 
returnee program serve 
to support PDO’s fixed 
costs 
under the Park admin. Even now: govt 
funding = restricted use of the money 
according to govt interest. 
 Individual donors 
 Private donors (CSR) 
Actors other than 
the state 
Korean chaebols incl. Hyundai 
United Nations <> 
representatives often in Geneva 
in KOCUN’s name 
 Numerous volunteers from civic society, 
willing to learn and teach, including Master’s 
and PhD students ex. Ewha Univ. volunteer 
association to teach Korean, citizens 
interested in human rights, in South East 
Asia, etc. 
 Group of lawyers willing to work 
specifically for women migrants using fees 
from their respective firms 
 Medical corporations offering care and 
assistance, generally to domestic violence 
victims 
 Other social actors 
 Private companies willing to incorporate 
migrant women in their CSR programs 
Policy 
development 
 NGO reports consulted for 
policy-making  
 Wish to change husband 
sponsorship of visa 
 Other administrative 
changes for more 
administrative accessibility 
to non-Koreans 
 Government organizing seminars and 
inviting NGOs on particular topics, each 
administration selects a particular 
organization to represent an issue. Problem: 
migrant women are scared of participating 
because of having to confront governmental 
authority and being exposed to the public.  
 The Center conducts extensive research and 
transmits its results to governments.  
Identified issues 
 Husband-sponsorship of 
visa and documents 
handled only by the 
husband/Korean national 
 Korean nationality takes too 
long to obtain 
 Assimilationist and 
ethnocentric model 
 Decrease in public funding 
for pre-departure 
orientation 
 Cultural differences 
between Korea and 
countries of origin of 
marriage migrants 
 As long as the law is designed to protect the 
Korean husband and support a blood-
relation paradigm, policy will not change 
no matter the administration 
 Govt Damunhwa centers do not want to deal 
with women who came as labor migrants, 
despite the fact they represent about 70% of 
multicultural spouses! Vs. 30% marriage 
migrants targeted by existing laws. 
 Absence of an independent public fund for 
NGOs to work without political influence 
 Hard to avoid government influence in their 
work anyway, always facing legal 
limitations 
 Immigrant women have to publicly rally for 
their own rights but might face public 
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 For divorce & separation 
issues, MM do not usually 
go to damunhwa centers 
which are where their 
husbands ‘allow’ them to go, 
associated with his authority 
 Runaway brides have to go 
in hiding and work 
illegally → precarity 
backlash and not be protected (ex. picture on 
the internet) 
 Incomplete law: In many cases such as 





No specific educational program 
or campaign on the issue of 
marriage migrants. Negative 
outlook of Korean society and 
conservative media on the 
issue. Backlash against the 
MOGEF for budget allowance to 
multicultural families. 
Publication of booklets and research as a bid to 
inform the general public. Public knowledge 
production. 
Final thoughts on 
Korean 
multiculturalism  
Wish for a fairer society 
including less hierarchy 
between cultures and less 
forced assimilation. Will 
eventually happen as Vietnam is 
developing fast and Vietnamese 
women are more educated. 
Hope for more ‘natural’ 
marriages without marriage 
brokers and will from Korean 
husbands to ‘do their part’ 
including receiving their own 
pre-marriage orientation. 
The word damunhwa should not even be used as 
it is tied to a blood-related and patriarchal idea 
of narrow assimilation as multiculturalism. 
Produces situations like stateless children.  
Despite an incomplete legal framework, the 
high number of migrants as a pressing issue, 
nothing is really changing. Pessimistic as to 
Korea’s ability to change. 
As long as damunhwa policy is considered a 
demographic issue (fertility, ageing), 
discrimination cannot be removed. These women 
are not accepted as valuable workers either. 
Among 217 damunhwa centers in Korea, only 1 
has a migrant woman as an executive. 
Vicious cycle of poverty and cultural erasure 
for them and their children.  
Expression of damunhwa ‘wall’ (jang-byeok): 
restricted by the notion, label & framework. 
All issues that have to be simultaneously 






4. Pictures from the Korean-Vietnamese Multicultural 
Support Center in Cần Thơ, Vietnam14 
 
Opening ceremony for the KVMS center in the presence of its main sponsor, 
Hyundai Motor 
 
Performance by Vietnamese returnees and their children at the KVMS center 
opening facility 
                                                 
14 Retrieved from The Korea Times: 




5. Front cover of “TIME’S UP: GENDER EQUALITY 
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